1 Tagungsort
2 Programm
3 Teilnehmer
4 Vorträge und Abstracts
"Märkisches Gildehaus", Schwielowseestraße 58, 14548 Caputh, tel: 033209 7790, fax: 033209 70836, info@maerkisches-gildehaus.deVom Bahnhof Schwielowsee ist der Tagungsort ca 150 m Fußweg entfernt. Über die lokalen Verbindungen (z.B. von Potsdam Hauptbahnhof, Flughafen Tegel (Berlin), S Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld DB, S+U Zoologischer Garten DB) zur Haltestelle "Caputh, Bahnhof Schwielowsee" kann man sich informieren unter http://www.fahrinfo-berlin.de/. Weitere Hinweise zum Tagungsort und zur Anreise finden sich im WWW unter http://www.mgh-info.de/index2.htm.
| Mi. 6 Apr. | |||||
| 14:00 | Koordinatorentreffen | ||||
| 16:00 | Vorstandssitzung | ||||
| 17:30 | Abendessen | ||||
| 18:30 - 20:00 | Chair: | Helmut Bester | |||
| 18:30 - 19:15 | Elmar Wolfstetter | Auctions with benefits to losers: with applications to divorce, collusion, and corruption |
Discussant | Paul Schweinzer | |
| 19:15 - 20:00 | Benny Moldovanu | Mixed Bundling Auctions | Discussant | Jianpei Li | |
| 20:00 - 21:00 | Mitgliederversammlung | ||||
| Do. 7. April | |||||
| 8:00 | Frühstück | ||||
| 9:00 - 12:30 | Chair | Klaus Schmidt | |||
| 9:00 - 9:45 | Burkhard Schipper | Rage against Machines - How subjects learn to play against computers | Discussant | Tim Grebe | |
| 9:45 - 10:30 | Timofey Mylovanov | Veto-based Delegation | Discussant | Georg Gebhardt | |
| 10:30 | Kaffeepause | ||||
| 11:00 - 11:45 | Roland Strausz | Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture | Discussant | Hans Zenger | |
| 11:45 - 12:30 | Georg Nöldeke | Extreme Adverse Selection and Market Breakdown | Discussant | Johannes Münster | |
| 12:30 | Mittagsessen | ||||
| 13:45 - 17:15 | Chair | Konrad Stahl | |||
| 13:45 - 14:30 | Frank Heinemann | Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination | Discussant | Eric Theissen | |
| 14:30 - 15:15 | Ossip Robert Hühnerbein | Collective Action Clause Thresholds in the Presence of Moral Hazard | Discussant | Elisabeth Müller | |
| 15:15 | Kaffeepause | ||||
| 15:45 - 16:30 | Ray Rees | Regulation of Insurance Markets | Discussant | Beate Jochimsen | |
| 16:30 - 17:15 | Kai Konrad | Multi-battle contests | Discussant | Jörg Oechssler | |
| 18:30 | Abendessen | ||||
| Fr. 8. April | |||||
| 8:00 | Frühstück | ||||
| 9:00 - 12:30 | Chair | Georg Nöldeke | |||
| 9:00 - 9:45 | Daniel Krähmer | Advertising and Conspicuous Consumption | Discussant | Patrick Beschorner | |
| 9:45 - 10:30 | Paul Heidhues | The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing | Discussant | Stephan Lauermann | |
| 10:30 | Kaffeepause | ||||
| 11:00 - 11:45 | Susanne Prantl | Firm Entry, Innovation and Growth: Theory and Micro Evidence | Discussant | Tobias Klein | |
| 11:45 - 12:30 | Konrad Stahl | Competing Marketplaces | Discussant | Thomas Giebe | |
| 12:30 | Mittagsessen | ||||
| Julia Bersch | C3 |
Julia.Bersch@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
| Patrick Beschorner | C2 |
beschorner@zew.de |
| Helmut Bester | A1 |
hbester@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de |
| Gerlinde Fellner | C7 |
fellner@uni-bonn.de |
| Helga Gebauer* | Z |
helga.gebauer@uni-mannheim.de |
| Georg Gebhardt | A4 |
georg.gebhardt@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
| Thomas Giebe | A7 |
giebe@wiwi.hu-berlin.de |
| Tim Grebe | A7 |
grebe@wiwi.hu-berlin.de |
| Paul Heidhues | C5 |
heidhues@wz-berlin.de |
| Frank Heinemann | C3 |
frank.heinemann@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
| Ossip Robert Hühnerbein | C3 |
Ossip.huehnerbein@web.de |
| Gerhard Illing | C3 |
Illing@lmu.de |
| Beate Jochimsen | A2 |
beate.jochimsen@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de |
| Florian Kajuth | C3 |
florian.kajuth@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
| Tobias Klein | C6 |
klein@econ.uni-mannheim.de |
| Kai Konrad | A2 |
kkonrad@wz-berlin.de |
| Daniel Krähmer | A1 |
kraehmer@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de |
| Stephan Lauermann | C7 |
s.lauermann@web.de |
| Jianpei Li | A7 |
lijianpei@wiwi.hu-berlin.de |
| Benny Moldovanu | A3 |
mold@uni-bonn.de |
| Elisabeth Müller | C2 |
mueller@zew.de |
| Johannes Münster | A2 |
muenster@wz-berlin.de |
| Timofey Mylovanov | A5 |
tmylovan@uni-bonn.de |
| Georg Nöldeke | C7 |
georg.noldeke@uni-bonn.de |
| Jörg Oechssler | C4 |
oechssler@uni-bonn.de |
| Susanne Prantl | C5 |
prantl@wz-berlin.de |
| Ray Rees | C3 |
ray.rees@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
| Burkhard Schipper | C4 |
schipper@uni-bonn.de |
| Klaus Schmidt | A4 |
klaus.schmidt@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
| Paul Schweinzer | A3 |
Paul.schweinzer@uni-bonn.de |
| Urs Schweizer | A5 |
schweizer@uni-bonn.de |
| Carolin Socher | B2 |
socher@bwl.uni-muenchen.de |
| Konrad Stahl | C2, C6 |
kos@econ.uni-mannheim.de |
| Roland Strausz | A1 |
strausz@zedat.fu-berlin.de |
| Eric Theissen | C7 |
theissen@uni-bonn.de |
| Elmar Wolfstetter | A7 |
wolfstetter@wiwi.hu-berlin.de |
| Hans Zenger | C3 |
hans.zenger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de |
Paul HEIDHUES: The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing
We develop a model in which a profit-maximizing monopolist with uncertain cost of production sells to loss-averse, yet rational, consumers. We first introduce (portable) techniques for analyzing the demand of such consumers, and then investigate the monopolist's pricing strategy. In contrast to the standard monopoly model, we find that in relatively stable environments, the firm chooses a discrete price distribution, endogenously giving rise to a kinked demand curve. A low price responsiveness of demand and a high frequency of purchase by consumers also promote such "price stickiness". Whether or not the monopolist's prices are sticky, markups follow a countercyclical pattern. Despite this tendency toward price stability, there are also circumstances in which a firm with unchanging cost offers random "sales" to attract more demand at higher prices.
Frank HEINEMANN: Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination
In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at driving agents' actions as close as possible to the economic fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold public information because its potential to serve as a focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of public announcements. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents. Restrictions on the degree of publicity are a better instrument with which to prevent the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. The optimal degree of publicity is always positive.
Ossip Robert HÜHNERBEIN: Collective Action Clause Thresholds in the Presence of Moral Hazard
As a response to recurring roll-over crises of sovereign debtors the IMF has recently advocated the inclusion of so called collective action clauses (CAC) in sovereign bond contracts. These clauses allow the financial terms of a bond contract to be changed by a specified fraction of bondholders while binding in dissenting creditors. Thereby they abrogate the coordination problem among bondholders that gives rise to self-fulfilling crises. However, it was also argued that CAC, by facilitating repudiation, render debtors without proper incentives to undertake policies directed to repay in full. This paper addresses the effect of the specified approval quota on the debtor's behaviour. The trade-off between inefficient roll-over crises and debtor moral hazard is formalized in a model with endogenous short-term debt. It is shown that higher thresholds tend to have a disciplining effect on the debtor. However, the most disciplining contract is not optimal.
Kai A. KONRAD and Dan Kovenock: Multi-battle contests
We study effort in repeated battles (races) with applications to war, sports and R&D among others. Players compete in a series of single battles. They can win intermediate prizes in each battle, and, in addition, a large prize is allocated as a function of the number of battle successes and defeats. Each single battle is an all-pay auction with complete information. We analytically characterize the unique equilibrium. The equilibrium has endogenous uncertainty, even a large lead by one player does not discourage the other player to continue the race, and each state that can be reached is reached with positive probability in the equilibrium.
Daniel KRÄHMER: Advertising and Conspicuous Consumption
The paper formalizes the intuition that brands are consumed for symbolic reasons and that advertising is critical in linking brands with meanings. The key idea is that advertising informs the public of brand names and creates the possibility of conspicuous consumption by rendering brands a signalling device. In a price competition framework, we show that advertising increases consumers' willingness to pay and thus provide a foundation, based on optimization behavior, for persuasive approaches to advertising. Moreover, we derive an overinvestment entry deterrence result and show that there might be too much advertising, and that competition might be socially undesirable.
Benny MOLDOVANU: Mixed Bundling Auctions
We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations. We introduce a bundling parameter that enhances the probability that all objects will be sold to one bidder. This raises competition on the one hand, but causes inefficiency on the other. We find that, for any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. Finally, we show that the revenue increasing effects of mixed bundling are robust to the introduction of reserve prices.
Tymofiy MYLOVANOV: Veto-based Delegation
This paper argues that in a principal-agent model with hidden informationand no monetary transfers, the principal can achieve any incentive compatibleoutcome with very little commitment. In fact, the main functions of commitmentin this environment are (1) to allow the principal to design the defaultoutcome and (2) to ensure that the principal has almost no formal controlover the agent's decisions. I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentivecompatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation.
Georg NÖLDEKE and George Mailath: Extreme Adverse Selection and Market Breakdown
This paper studies a market for a risky asset with an informed trader. We consider the limit behavior of market outcomes as the adverse selection problem becomes extreme in the sense that the distribution of private information converges to a distribution with unbounded support. A simple necessary and sufficient condition for market breakdown is obtained. If the condition fails, then there exists competitive outcomes that converge to positive levels of trade whenever it is first best to have trade. When the condition fails, no feasible (competitive or not) market outcomes converges to positive levels of trade.
Susanne PRANTL: Firm Entry, Innovation and Growth: Theory and Micro Evidence
How does entry affect innovation incentives and productivity growth in incumbent firms? A first look at micro-data suggests that incumbents in technologically advanced industries react positively to entry, but not firms in laggard industries. To explain this pattern, we introduce entry into a Schumpeterian growth model with multiple sectors which differ by their distance to the technological frontier. We show that entry threat spurs innovation incentives in technologically advanced sectors - successful innovation allows incumbents to prevent entry. In laggard sectors it discourages innovation - increased entry reduces incumbents' expected rents from innovating. We test these predictions using rich plant and firm level panel data for the UK and control for the endogeneity of entry by exploiting the large number of policy reforms undertaken during the Thatcher era. Our empirical findings are consistent with the predictions derived from the theory.
Ray REES: Regulation of Insurance Markets
Both the theory and the practice of insurance market regulation focus on the regulation of solvency of insurance companies. Relatively neglected topics are however first, the perceptions that insurance buyers have of the insolvency risk of an insurer and the effect of this on their insurance demand, and secondly, the costs to insurers of holding solvency reserves. This paper extends earlier models of insurers' choices of reserves to incorporate more realistic treatments of both these issues, and then shows the implications for solvency regulation policy.
Burkhard C. SCHIPPER, Peter Duersch, Albert Kolb, and Jörg Oechssler: Rage against Machines - How subjects learn to play against computers
We explore experimentally learning in games but control for the learning behavior of opponents. Subjects learn to play against computers programmed to learning theories such as best-reply learning, fictitious play, imitate-the-best, reinforcement learning and trail & error. Repeated interaction takes place in a finite symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and unit costs. A large data-set is collected through the internet as well as the laboratory. We find that successful subjects develop distinct patterns of behavior that often do not correspond to any learning theory considered. Subjects are most successful when playing against reinforcement learning and least successful when playing against imitate-the-best. Overall, among all learning theories considered, imitate-the-best and reinforcement learning describe the behavior of subjects best. Most learning theories have economic value in the sense that if a subject would follow the recommendation of a learning theory, she could improve her payoff. Our treatments allow us to analyze incentive effects in data generated through the internet versus the lab.
Konrad STAHL, Volker Nocke and Martin Peitz: Competing Marketplaces
We develop a general theoretical framework of competing market places. Each market place consists of a platform - owned by one large or a large number of small intermediaries - on which heterogeneous buyers and sellers interact. Network effects are two-sided: buyers are attracted to market places that house many sellers, while sellers are attracted to market places that draw many buyers. The focus of our analysis is on the impact of ownership structure on the equilibrium platform sizes (or, equivalently, on product diversity offered by the market place) and on welfare. We consider both competition between platforms with the same ownership structure as well as competition between platforms with different ownership structures. Amongst other things we show that a platform owned by a single intermediary (e.g., a shopping mall) will attract more buyers and sellers than a rival platform owned by a large number of small intermediaries (e.g., a downtown retailing district) if network effects are strong, while the reverse holds if network effects are weak.
Roland STRAUSZ: Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture
This paper studies problems of capture in certification markets. It derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. Moreover, it identifies a general principle of reputation models that favors concentration. This explains certifiers as efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms. The analysis yields the following insights: 1) A demand for external certification exists, despite being costly and susceptibility to capture. 2) Low discount factors require a price of certification that exceeds the static monopoly price. 3) Price competition tends to a monopolization of certification markets. 4) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a natural monopoly.
Elmar WOLFSTETTER: Auctions with benefits to losers: with applications to divorce, collusion, and corruption
In some auctions the revenue is (partly) shared by the winner and (all or some) losers. Examples range from inheritance and divorce rules for household and business partnerships, to regular auctions and procurements in the face of bidder collusion or bid rigging by a corrupt agent auctioneer. This paper provides a unified solution for a large class of such auction games.
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